Is HIV "Extraordinary"?
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act")1 attempts to reduce inconsistencies in the sentences of defendants convicted of comparable crimes.2 The Act created a Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") and authorized it to promulgate a set of sen tencing guidelines to steer judicial decisionmaking.3 To fulfill this mandate, the Commission drafted the Federal Sentencing Guide lines (the "Guidelines"), which Congress enacted in 1987.4
Although Congress wanted to eliminate sentencing disparities, it also wanted to allow some degree of individualized sentencing.5 To achieve the correct balance, the Commission created three catego ries of characteristics: those a court must consider in sentencing each defendant;6 those a court must never consider;7 and those that, while normally irrelevant to sentencing decisions, a court may con sider when circumstances warrant.8 Among the characteristics usu-ally inapposite to a sentencing court's decision is the physical condition of the defendant -a consideration mentioned in section 5H1.4 of the Guidelines.9 Only when the defendant's condition represents an "extraordinary physical impairment"10 may the sen tencing court grant a downward departure or consider a sentence other than imprisonment, 11
Courts have been unable to agree on the question of whether HIV-positive status, HIV with an attending medical complication, or AIDS should count as extraordinary physical impairments war ranting a downward departure.12 Unfortunately, this problem will not fade away. Experts predict that the number of HIV infections will increase in the coming years,13 disproportionately affecting criminal populations.14 This Note argues that HIV-positive status, HIV with an attending medical complication, and AIDS should not automatically qualify as extraordinary physical impairments.
Rather, the sentencing court should make findings of fact to deter mine whether the individual defendant suffers from a related com plication -either before or after any explicit application of the Koon decision, sentencing courts still must decide whether HIV and AIDS warrant down ward departures. Consequently, courts must continue to wrestle with the question this Note addresses. 
12.
Compare United States v. Shein, 31 F.3d 135, 138 {3d Cir. 1994) (arguing that HIV with a serious complication should count as an extraordinary physical impairment) with United States v. DePew, 751 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (E.D. Va. 1990 ) {"Only an 'extraordinary physical impairment' may justify a sentence other than imprisonment. AIDS is not such a 'physical impairment' ... . " (citation omitted)). One court has even found that all three conditions might qualify if particular, though unspecifi ed, characteristics were present. See United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 729 {8th Cir. 1995) ("To some extent, both sides have argued this case as if it presented the abstract question whether someone with an HIV infec· tion, or with ARC, or with AIDS, is suffering from an 'extraordinary physical impairment. ' No doubt there is a sense in which an affirm ative answer would be proper in all three of these situations.").
13. Despite the relatively limited number of ways in which an individual can contract the HIV virus, the number of those infected has increased rapidly, and experts expect further growth in the coming years. See Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald H. Friedland, Tr ansmissio n and Tr eatment, in AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FOR THE PuBLIC 18, 19 {Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993). The World Health Organization has estimated that between eight and ten million adults and one million children may be infected worldwide and that the numbers may quadruple by the year 2000. See id. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control {CDC) had received reports of 200,000 cases of full-blown AIDS by 1991. See id. These cases generally repid Perlman, AIDS Deaths Drop Sharply Again in S.F., S.F. CHRoN., Oct. 15, 1997, at Al (noting a trend in the declining number of AIDS cases and deaths in San Francisco).
AIDS label -such that the related complication qu alifies him for a downward departure.is
To support this claim, this Note proceeds in two steps. Part I provides a systematic test for courts to consider in determining whether an extraordinary physical impairment exists. It then exam ines the legislative history and language of the Act, the language of the Guidelines, and several cases that have addressed this issue. Using these sources, this Part identifies four relevant factors that should guide the extraordinary physical impairment determination.16
Part II applies this four-factor test to HIV and argues that one factor, the severity and predictability factor, proves determinative in assessing the applicability of HIV status to downward departures. It then posits that the remainin� factors of the general test enunci ated in Part I all point toward declaring HIV ordinary. This Note argues that these labels, while helpful, fail to correspond to the Guidelines' requirements for finding a physical impairment extraordinary. The CDC classifications neither provide nor are intended to provide courts with the kind of guidance required in this area. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
MacGillis also argues that in addition to § 5Hl.4, § 5K2.0 -the catchall departure guide line that allows downward departures for conditions the Commission did not consider ade quately -supports finding AIDS and advanced IDV to be extraordinary impairments. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0; see also MacGillis , supra, at 241-42. Sections 5K2.0 and 5Hl.4, however, are related in a way that makes discussion of both unnecessary. '!lie term "extraordinary" in § 5Hl.4 represents the physical condition analogue to § 5K2.0's general directive about inad equately considered conditions. See 
PART I: CRAFTING THE EXTRAORDINARY PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT TEST
This Part suggests a test for sentencing courts to use in deciding whether a defendant suffers from an extraordinary physical impair ment. It considers the statutory language and history of the Sen tencing Reform Act, the language of the Guidelines, and several cases in compiling a comprehensive list of factors a court should consider.17 It concludes that there are four18 relevant factors: (1) whether the condition severely and predictably impairs the defend ant; (2) whether the prison system is able to provide necessary med ical care; (3) whether incarceration will worsen the defendant's condition; and ( 4) whether the condition exposes the defendant to victimization.19 17. Section I.A refers to statutory debates and language surrounding both the general departure standard and those sections relating directly to physical condition. The Sentencing Commission ultimately placed the general standard in § 5K2.0 and the physical condition standard in § 5Hl.4. While this Note concentrates on § 5Hl.4, the interrelation between the two provisions, see supra note 15, makes an inquiry into Congress's attitude toward the gen eral standard a worthwhile and germane endeavor.
18. Courts and commentators have discussed two additional factors that this Note con tends are irrelevant. First, they have considered the cost of caring for the defendant. See Rabins, 63 F.3d at 735-37 (Wi ison, J., dissenting); MacGillis, supra note 15, at 255. But § 5Hl.4, on which these courts rely, allows a sentencing court to consider the costs of caring for the defendant only in those cases in which the court has previously found the defendant to suffer from an extraordinary physical impairment.
This reading of the cost consideration is consistent with the overall two-step approach that Congress created for departure decisions. This Note addresses whether HIV should be considered extraordinary, but a sentencing court has two steps it must traverse before it can grant a departure. First, the court must determine whether the condition is extraordinary. Second, the court must determine whether that condition warrants a downward departure. Congress hinted at this two-part analysis when it explained:
A particular kind of circumstance, for example, might not have been considered by the Sentencing Commission at all because of its rarity, or it might have been considered only in its usual form and not in the particularly extreme form present in a particular case. The provision recognizes, however, that even though the judge finds an aggravat ing or mitigating circumstance in the case that was not adequately considered in the formulation of the guidelines, the judge might conclude that the circumstance does not justify a sentence outside the guidelines. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 78-79 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3261-62. This lan guage eventually found its way into § 5K2.0. Given the interaction between § 5K2.0 and § 5Hl.4, see supra note 15, that language is applicable in this case. Consequently, the court should first decide whether the condition is extraordinary and then decide whether it justifies a departure.
Second, courts have discussed the continued dangerousness of the defendant as a factor for departure. See, e.g., Rabins, 63 F.3d at 735-38 (Wilson, J., dissenting). This factor originates from the third of the original four purposes of sentencing: protecting the public from further crimes. Cf infra note 22 and accompanying text. No court has found this factor to be directly relevant to the impairment decision because releasing a criminally dangerous defendant violates the third purpose of sentencing regardless of his condition. See Congress intimated its disfavor with rehabilitation as a purpose in sentencing when it stated: "[A]lmost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now doubts that rehabilita tion can be induced reliably in a prison setting, and it is now quite certain that no one can One also finds Congress's intent to downplay a defendant's per sonal characteristics in its description of section 3553(a)(1), which calls on the sentencing judge to consider the defendant's history and characteristics.24 Congress stated, "[w]ith respect to the history and characteristics of the defendant, the judge must consider such matters as the criminal history of the defendant, as well as the na ture and effect of any previous criminal sanctions."25 Any similar directive with respect to a defendant's personal characteristics is conspicuously absent from Congress's discussion.
Congress's limitation of the consideration of a defendant's per sonal characteristics in the context of the penal system's goals sug gests that consideration of personal characteristics should be limited in sentencing decisions as well. Because physical condition is a personal characteristic, one may assume that Congress pre ferred that courts take the same overall approach with respect to it as they do toward personal characteristics in general.
A given personal characteristic does become relevant to a de fendant's sentence when it is severe.26 1\vo arguments support this position. First, Congress used the analogous word "serious" in describing conditions that should qualify as extraordinary physical impairments.27 In describing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(5),28 the provision that instructs the Commission to consider physical condition, Con gress stated that under certain circumstances involving a "particu larly serious illness," a court may give probation to a defendant who otherwise would go to prison.29
Second, Congress intimated a severity requirement in its paral lel treatment of downward departures for physical condition and sentence modifications.3 0 These two provisions address similar is sues, but at different stages in the penal process. Downward depar- tures address any conditions present at the time of sentencing, while modifications address conditions that have developed or progressed while the inmate was in prison. Congress declared that a severe ill ness would suffice for both determinations.31 To give courts guidance, Congress cited terminal cancer, an obviously se vere example.32
The Sentencing Commission followed through on Congress's di rectives and incorporated them into the Guidelines. The Commis sion emphasized criminal, rather than personal, characteristics.33 The Commission also adopted almost verbatim Congress's language limiting relevant physical conditions to those that are severe.34
First, the Commission created guidelines that define "the de fendant strictly in criminal terms, not personal ones."35 Conse quently, personal characteristics, as a general category, ordinarily are irrelevant to a sentencing court's decision.36 Personal charac teristics, such as physical condition, become part of the sentencing consideration only when they are extraordinary in nature.37
The Guidelines provide little room for a court to consider the defendant's personal traits in sentencing. Second, and more important, the Commission adopted Con gress's language in discussing the specific role of extraordinary physical impairments. Section SH1.4 provides that the defendant's condition must be both serious and incapacitating to justify a depar ture. In defining which physical conditions could constitute grounds for a departure, section SH1.4 uses the word "impairment" and gives as an example a "seriously infirm defendant."43 The word "impairment" alone requires that there be some reduction in the defendant's ability to function. If this were not the case, and the defendant could function normally despite his condition, there would be no reason for a court to declare his case extraordinary and section SH1.4 would not apply. In addition, the Commission's use of the word "seriously" indicates that it took to heart Congress's limitation on the applicability of nonsevere conditions.
In short, Congress made clear its intention that only severe con ditions should qualify as extraordinary physical impairments. The Commission, following that directive, then created Guidelines that appropriately limited extraordinary physical impairments to severe conditions.44
Th e Predictability Requirement
Congress wanted defendants convicted of similar conduct to re ceive similar sentences and wanted those sentences to be fair and rational. This section argues that Congress's desire for fairness and rationality militates in favor of establishing a predictability require ment for physical impairment decisions.
The central goal of the Act was to eliminate sentencing dispari ties among similarly situated defendants.45 Congress wanted to en courage fairness by reducing disparity.46 In fact, Congress directed judges to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dispar ities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct."47 Similarly, Congress instructed the Sen tencing Commission to create guidelines that "provide .. . fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing."48 In relation to an ex traordinary physical impairment, fairness means that defendants with identical conditions should receive identical sentences.4 9 Were this not the case, courts could treat defendants who have precisely the same symptoms and prognoses differently.
Congress emphasized that courts should be concerned with the fairness of their sentences "particularly in deciding when it is desir able to sentence outside the Guidelines. "SO In responding to a se ries of amendments offered by the House, the Senate clarified that the amendments would have no effect on the departure standard. Indeed, Senator Hatch said specifically that "[t]he standard for de parture is vital to the proper functioning of the Guidelines system, " and that should Congress relax the standard, "unwarranted depar tures would undermine the core function of the Guidelines . . . which is to reduce disparity ... and restore fairness ... to the sen tencing process." S l Congress also aspired to create guidelines that would structure the sentencing decision and thereby rationalize the sentencing pro cess.s2 To emphasize its desires, Congress disparaged other sys tems s3 as "completely ineffective in ... imposing a rational order on ... criminal sentencing."s4 Sentencing decisions based on unpre dictable conditions only add irrationality to the process, as they amount to little more than pure soothsaying.ss Courts therefore would irrationally grant different departures to identically situated defendants, thereby violating congressional intent. 55. Congress chose to avoid decisions based on insufficient information when it chose to relegate rehabilitation in sentencing defendants to a minor role. It feared that our knowl edge of human behavior was too limited to serve as a basis for determining the length of a defendant's incarceration. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223 ("We know too little about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a particular prisoner has been rehabilitated.").
B. Providing th e Necessary Medical Care
A court should consider whether the prison system can provide a defendant with needed medical care,56 and, as a general rule, should not grant a downward departure if a defendant's condition is one for which the prison system can provide the necessary care. Section 3553(a)(2)(D)57 mandates that the court consider whether the sentence can "provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. "58 By logical extension, a court could label a condition extraordinary and depart from the Guidelines if its treatment requires more care than the prison system provides.
In United States v. Greenwood, 59 the Fourth Circuit faced such a question. In that case, the government appealed the district court's downward departure, granted because the defendant was a Korean War veteran who had lost both his legs below the knee during his tour of duty.60 The court affirm ed the district court's downward departure because incarceration would have jeopardized the treat ment Greenwood had been receiving at the Veterans Administra tion Hospital.6 1
C. Prison's Effect on th e Defendant's Condition62
A court also should determine whether a defendant's time in prison will worsen his condition. As with the adequate care factor, 58. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added). The validity of this reading of § 3553(a)(2)(D) becomes apparent when one compares it to § 994(k), which provides: "The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sen tence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correc tional treatment." 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994) (emphasis added). The only way to reconcile these two provisions is to read § 3553(a)(2)(D) as requiring a court to consider the possible inability of a sentence to provide the listed considerations as a drawback, rather than to consider that section as allowing a court to sentence a defendant to imprisonment to provide her with those services. this factor derives from section 3553(a)(2)(D), which requires a court to consider whether the sentence will provide the defendant with appropriate medical care.63 If incarceration would substan tially worsen a defendant's condition, clearly it would compromise the defendant's medical care and should weigh against a court's im posing that sentence.64
Few courts have considered the extent to which the prison sys tem must exacerbate the defendant's condition for it to become ju dicially cognizable. In United States v. Jefferson, 65 one of the few cases to consider this factor, the district court indicated that the de fendant must be able to prove more than that "the defendant's medical conditions have been aggravated by prison life."66 Instead, the court held that the defendant must proffer "'extraordinary and compelling reasons' for reduction of [his] term."67
D. Th e Possibility of Victimization
Finally, a court should ascertain whether the defendant's condi tion will expose her to victimization at the hands of his fellow in mates. Of all the factors in this test, the threat-of-victimization factor stands on the softest ground. Not only was this factor com pletely fashioned by the courts,68 but the Commission has since al tered the Guidelines in an attempt to deemphasize possible victimization as grounds for a departure.69 Nonetheless, possible victimization remains a permissible justification for a court that wishes to grant a downward departure.70 70. See, e.g., Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2051 {"The Commission did not see fit, however, to prohibit consideration of physical appearance in all cases, nor did it address the broader category of susceptibility to abuse in prison. By urging us to hold susceptibility to abuse in prison to be an impermissible factor in all cases, the Government would have us reject the Commission's considered judgment in favor of our own."). held that the same must be true for "the broader category of sus ceptibility to abuse in prison. "85
In brief, the confluence of the statutory language, legislative his tory, and several judicial opinions yields a four-factored test that a court should use to evaluate physical conditions. The relative weight that a court should give to each factor will depend on the nature of the condition and its interplay with each other factor. p ART II: HIV STATUS AND THE E XTRAORDINARY PHYSICAL
IMPAIRMENT TEST
Part II argues that, given the four-factored test articulated above, courts should refrain from focusing their physical impair ment determination on HIV's labels. Rather, they should focus on the defendant's attendant condition, if any. Specifically, this Part posits that the severe and predictable factor of the test proves de terminative as to whether a court should find an extraordinary physical impairment.
First, in applying the extraordinary physical impairment test to HIV status, section II.A argues that HIV's unpredictability makes the labels HIV and AIDS unreliable foundations for the extraordi nary physical impairment determination. Second, section II.A claims that the search for predictability correctly focuses the court on the nature of the condition that may accompany the defendant's HIV infection. It is this condition that may qualify as an extraordi nary physical impairment. This Part does not argue that HIV is completely irrelevant to the sentencing decision. For example, a court should view a defendant who is HIV-positive and has pneu monia diff erently from a defendant who has only pneumonia. This Part simply contends that the court should ask itself the following question: Taking the defendant's HIV status as a given, does the defendant suffer from an attendant condition that allows the court to predict with sufficient certainty her clinical outcome and its time frame? It is in this sense that the court should focus on the condi tion. The court should not ponder the defendant's viral load86 or CD4 counts,87 or rely on the number of years that have passed since 
A. Th e Severe and Predictable Condition
When a defendant's condition at the time of sentencing substan tially and permanently impairs him, or will do so with an acceptably predictable course,89 the court should find that it constitutes an ex traordinary physical impairment.90 HIV's unpredictable course91 88. Seroconversion "means that the blood (serum) changes (converts) from negative to positive for the antibody test." Id. at 31.
89. This Note purposely leaves concepts like "substantially impaired" and "acceptable predictability" somewhat undefined. Any such definitions, with respect to diseases like HIV, at their essence remain qualitative rather than quantitative. A terminal disease with a pre dictable course, however, should fall under these definitions. This Note uses "termin al" ac cording to its most common legal definition: a patient's condition is terminal when she has six months or less to live. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800(12) (1995) ('"Terminal disease' means an incurable and irreversible disease that ... will ... produce death within six (6) months."); 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b) (1997) (limiting the Medicare hospice benefi.t to patients with a "prognosis ... for a life expectancy of 6 months or less if the terminal illness runs its normal course"). Nevertheless, even this definition, at base, is qualitative. Rather than pro viding sentencing judges with a binary choice, this Note seeks to provide them with the cor rect question to ask. Specifically, it seeks to dissuade them from blindly using the categories of HIV and AIDS to make their decisions. It argues that judges should concentrate instead on the particular complication that accompanies an HIV infection to determine whether the condition warrants a downward departure. The term AIDS has a specific definition makes this factor the dominant one in a court's decision whether to grant the departure.92 This same unpredictability makes the labels HIV and AIDS poor foundations for an extraordinary physical im pairment decision.93 Instead, the sentencing court should focus on any condition that attends the defendant's HIV infection and grant a downward departure only if that condition provides the requisite predictability.
Predicting the course of HIV in a given individual is a daunting task because, on the individual level, HIV remains an erratic dis ease.94 The traditional understanding of HIV as a virus that pro gresses from a prolonged asymptomatic stage, to a mild illness stage, to a terminal stage over a predictable time period has proved not to fit reality.95 Instead, some individuals may develop severe complications soon after infection and die, while some may develop a complication, recover, and remain stable for years.96 Others may remain completely asymptomatic for years, while still others may appear outwardly healthy though their CD4 counts linger at levels under fifty cells per cubic millim eter.97
As researchers have made medical advances, doctors' ability to predict HIV-positive individuals' longevity has simultaneously im proved and worsened. On the one hand, new treatments have ex tended the average AIDS patient's life exp ectancy from a few that the CDC has created, and periodically rewritten, to allow it to track the spread of the disease. This discussion may make IIlV progression appear predictable across large numbers of people. On the individual level, however, its progression remains sporadic. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
92.
When applying the extraordinary physical impairment test to IIlV, this Note con cedes that mv infection is severe. It claims, however, that mv infection is too unpredict able to qualify alone as an extraordinary physical impairment, and that, consequently, the court should focus on the related complication.
93. Despite the apparent predictive value of the CDC's definition, see supra note 88, the CDC never intended for its classification system to serve diagnostic or prognostic ends. Rather, the CDC created this definition to count and track the spread and severity of the illness. [Vol. 96:1095 months to a few years.98 New drug combinations have enabled phy sicians to eliminate the virus from their patients' blood streams. 99 The long-term potential of these new treatments, however, remains uncertain.1°0 The uncertain success of these treatments adds to the unpredictability of individual prognoses.
On the other hand, scientists have identified better ways of de termining clinical outcomes. Most promisingly, researchers have developed viral load testing and have proved that a patient's viral load correlates with longevity.101 Nevertheless, while viral load can provide general guidelines for HIV progression and treatment, it is of limited value in ascertaining a given patient's longevity.10 2 Some conditions that accompany AIDS infection, however, may provide the requisite predictability. Instead of focusing on the de fendant's HIV classification, a court should contemplate his related complication and the likely impact it will have on his health. If the court can satisfy itself that this complication furnishes the necessary predictability, it should classify that complication as an extraordi nary physical impairment and depart downward.
Some have argued that courts have granted downward depar tures for conditions that seem much less extraordinary than AIDS or advanced HIV and that, therefore, AIDS or advanced HIV should qualify as well.1°3 Certain cases -such as the Fo urth Cir cuit decision that granted a downward departure to a defendant who had lost the lower part of both of his legs104 and the Third Circuit decision that affirm ed a departure for a defendant who suf fered from chronic pulmonary disease -might offer support for that argument.105 At first glance, these conditions do indeed ap-pear less "serious" than HIV infe ction. As Part I argues, _ however, the question under section 5H1.4 is not about which condition is worse in some absolute sense, but about which is worse in a predict able way. Both of the conditions mentioned above are static -at the time of sentencing, the court is cognizant of the future impact of each. At present, however, it is impossible for a court to have a similar understanding of the future effects of HIV or AIDS. With out this understanding, neither HIV nor AIDS should be classified as extraordinary under section 5H1.4.
Others have argued that courts should simply apply a per se rule to HIV.106 In particular, one author has argued that courts should draw the line at AIDS or advanced HIV.107 It is true that a test of this sort would provide a certain sort of predictability. Both outsid ers and defendants would know ex ante whether the defendant's status would qualify him for a downward departure.10 8 Neverthe less, it would fail to provide the kind of predictability Congress de sired and the Guidelines require. Fi rst, a rule of this type would fail to provide fairness. As argued above, advanced HIV and AIDS do not allow a court to predict longevity. Consequently, a court basing its decision on an AIDS classification might sentence two defend ants suffering from different complications -the true predictors of longevity -to identical sentences, thereby thwarting Congress's desire for fairness.
Second, a test of this sort fails to provide the kind of rationality Congress desired. A court attempting to determine the length of a downward departure by considering an AIDS classification alone would be forced to rely on an uneducated guess as to the effect of the disease on the defendant: W ill the defendant be incapacitated in ten weeks, ten months, or ten years? Basing a sentencing deci sion on something so mercurial, and thereby divorcing the sentenc ing decision from the defendant's true state, can only undermine Congress's desire for rational, principled decisionmaking.
HIV and AIDS alone are simply too unpredictable to provide a foundation for a downward departure decision. Instead, a court should focus on the complication that accompanies the infection to determine whether it provides the necessary predictability.
106. See, e.g., MacGillis, supra note 15, at 247.
See id.
108. A test of this sort might also simplify judicial administration. It certainly is simpler to determine whether the defendant falls into one of the CDC's classifications than it is to determine the effect the defendant's related complication will have. Nevertheless, this Note argues that the Guidelines demand this kind of inquiry.
B. Providing th e Necessary Medical Care
Several courts have argued that the Federal Bureau of Prisons can adequately serve inmates with IIlV and AIDs.109 In general, the correctional system carries a constitutional obligation to pro vide its inmates with adequate medical care.110 "The Supreme Court has declared that ... 'deliberate indifference' by a correc tional system to the serious medical needs of its prisoners consti tutes the kind of 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' that is proscribed by the eighth amendment."111
The prison system, therefore, has a duty to provide IIlV positive inmates with the medical care they require.11 2 In response to this mandate, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has created a multi layered medical system. Each inmate has a specified number of physicians, nurses, pharmacists and other medical personnel who are responsible for monitoring his condition.113 The Bureau of Pris ons also operates six specialized medical facilities, with the two principal facilities for men in Springfield, Missouri, and Rochester, Minnesota, and the principal one for women in Lexington, Ken tucky.114 The Federal Bureau of Prisons also implemented regula tions on Ja nuary 22, 1991 that deal specifically with IIlV-positive 109. See United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 1995) (refusing to grant a downward departure because the HIV-positive defendant offered no evidence that he re quired care beyond what the prison system could provide); United States v. We iss, 989 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant could receive adequate care for later stages of AIDS while in prison, so declining a request for a downward departure). One court even went so far as to hold that the defendant's condition had deteriorated enough to constitute an extraordinary physical impairment, but that it would be inhumane to release him because he had nowhere to receive treatment. See United States v. Streat, 893 F. Supp. 754, 757 (N.D. Ohio 1995). This decision would seem to indicate that not only does the Fe deral Bureau of Prisons provide reasonable medical care, but that, at least with respect to some defendants, it provides them with the best care they can get. The validity of this decision is questionable, however, at least if used to detain defendants for the purposes of providing medical care, given § 994(k)'s provision that it is inappropriate for a court to consider this factor in sen tencing. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1983); supra note 58. Incarceration does not worsen an IDV-positive defendant's con dition sufficiently to warrant a downward departure. Because a de fendant must assert "extraordinary and compelling reasons" in order to qualify for a departure, he may not argue that simply being in prison generally exacerbates his condition.131 This reasoning ap pears to preclude a defendant from arguing, for example, that the stress of being in prison will worsen his condition. Instead, the de fendant must plead something more substantial.
Some argue that the condition of a defendant who has a weak ened immune system necessarily will worsen while he is in prison.132 For example, two commentators argue that an HIV-posi tive inmate's weakened immune system makes him especially vul nerable to diseases such as tuberculosis (TB), and that given TB's resurgence in urban areas, IITV-positive inmates increasingly will face exposure to it in the New Yo rk State prison system.133 It is quite possible that this kind of threat would constitute extraordi nary and compelling circumstances. These analysts focus on the New Yo rk State prison system, however, rather than on the Federal Bureau of Prisons.134
The federal system provides its inmates with up-to..:date medical care and transfers them to modem medical facilities when their im mune systems become seriously compromised.135 In addition, the Federal Bureau of Prisons isolates inmates with highly communica ble diseases like TB so that, as much as possible, HIV-positive in mates remain safe.136 Thus, while no prison system ever will be utterly without cross-contamination among inmates, the Federal Bureau of Prisons provides an environment in which this factor does not rise to a level of extraordinariness.
Moreover, this argument focuses solely on a defendant's HIV status and not on his attending complication. In effect, the argu ment is as follows: IIlV weakens an individual's immune response; prison may be a place where the defendant will be exposed to other diseases; and the combination of these two factors means that prison will cause his condition, defined as his health generally, to decline. As noted in section II.A, however, concerns about health in general do not justify a downward departure -courts instead should focus on the related complication.
D. Th e Possibility of Vi ctimization
The potential for victimization does not warrant a downward departure. While some claim that HIV-positive inmates are more susceptible to abuse than are normal inmates, they provide little evidence for this assertion.137 Not only is there little evidence that HIV-positive inmates are more susceptible to abuse than other in-mates, intuitively it would seem they would be less so. Given that IIlV is transmitted through bodily fluid contact, inmates should be more likely to avoid their IIlV-positive fellow inmates than to as sault them.138 And while ostracism of this type certainly is unpleas ant, it is not cognizable under the Sentencing Guidelines as abuse.139
Fm ally, as with the concern that incarceration will worsen the defendant's condition, the victimization factor does not relate di rectly to a court's decision concerning a related complication. The victimization argument hinges on the claim that other inmates will harbor a distaste for IIlV-positive inmates and abuse them as a re sult. No one claims that inmates will abuse fellow inmates who are IIlV-positive because of their related complication, say pneumonia. Potential abuse thus is inapposite to the IIlV question for two rea sons. Fir st, it is unlikely that inmates will abuse other inmates be cause of their lilV status. Second, it is even less likely they will abuse them because of their related complication, which is, as Part II argues, the relevant consideration given the Guidelines and their statutory foundation.
In short, Part II argues that, as applied to IIlV status, the sever ity-and-predictability factor is both necessary and sufficient. The first factor is determinative because neither IIlV nor AIDS in the absence of an attending illness is sufficiently predictable to qualify under this requirement. Furthermore, each of the remaining three factors points toward :finding lilV status and AIDS ordinary, and suggests that IIlV-related complications are ordinary or irrelevant.
C ONCLUSION
During the last few years, IIlV's progression has become more erratic and diffi cult to forecast rather than less so. During this same period, the number of individuals with the disease has increased steadily. At least for the foreseeable future, this second trend will continue and the justice system will feel its impact as much as any other area of society. Ti me and again judges will face an IIlV- positive defendant asking for a downward departure. Should the court grant that departure?
This Note has argued that a court facing this question should do more than ascertain whether the defendant is IDV-positive. In stead the court should ask, does the complication, if any, accompa nying the defendant's IDV infection severely and predictably impair the defendant? Only if the court can answer this question affirm atively should it grant a downward departure.
